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This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model that shows that combin-
ing capital market imperfections together with unequal access to investment
opportunities across individuals can generate endogenous and permanent ﬂuctua-
tions in aggregate GDP, investment, and interest rates. Reducing inequality of
access may be a necessary condition for macroeconomic stabilization. Moreover,
countercyclical ﬁscal policies have a role to play: in our model savings are
underutilized in slumps because of the limited debt capacity of potential investors.
Therefore, the government should issue public debt during recessions in order to
absorb those idle savings and ﬁnance investment subsidies or tax cuts for
investors.
The most important single fact about saving and investment
activities is that in our industrial society they are generally
done by different people and for different reasons. (. . .) For
years there might tend to be too little investment, leading to
deﬂation, losses, excess capacity and unemployment. For
other years, there might tend to be too much investment,
leading to periods of chronic inﬂation—unless prudent and
proper public policies in the ﬁscal and monetary ﬁelds are
followed [Paul A. Samuelson, Economics 8th edition, 1970,
pp. 196–198].
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that the separation of savers and investors has
implications for the short-run macroeconomic stability of an
economy is an idea that goes back at least to Keynes [1936] and
Harrod [1939]. This paper represents an attempt to address this
question within the framework of a simple macroeconomic model
with explicit micro-foundations.
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savers and investors: sheer physical separation, manifested in the
fact that savers and investors are often different people in the
sense that many people who save are in no position to invest
directly in physical (as distinct from ﬁnancial) capital; and a more
market-based separation embodied in the constraints on the
amounts investors can borrow from savers.
We will justify the borrowing constraints by invoking the
usual excuse of asymmetric information, modeled here as an ex
post moral hazard problem. By a careful choice of parameters we
ensure that the solution to this problem takes the extremely
simple form of a credit multiplier. In other words, there is a
constant n,1 such that anyone who wants to invest an amount I
must have assets of at least nI.1
There are a number of reasons why not all savers are also
investors in the sense of being able to invest in physical capital.
First, being able to invest may be crucially dependent on having
certain skills, ideas, and connections: for the vast majority of
individuals, the idea of using one’s savings to borrow additional
funds in order to open a new factory or purchase capital equip-
ment makes no sense at all. Second, unequal access to investment
opportunities may just be an extreme consequence of the credit
constraints themselves: many investments are indivisible and
require a certain minimum investment. In a world where capital
markets are imperfect, this means that the investor would have to
put up a minimum amount of his own wealth; those who cannot
afford this minimum amount will not be able to make direct
investments in production and will have to put their money in a
bank that then lends their savings to active investors. Third,
distances may limit the ability of investors to invest: the invest-
ment might require the investor to live and work in the city,
whereas he may have other reasons for wanting to live in a village.
Investors may also be restricted by social distance: investing in
most industries involves some degree of cooperation with inves-
tors in other industries and even with investors in other ﬁrms in
the same industry. Therefore, if an industrial sector is dominated
by people from one social group, and people from this social group
are known to cooperate better with their own (perhaps for the
1. There is now a large body of evidence documenting that such borrowing
constraints have large effects on investor behavior even in countries like the
United States which have well-developed capital markets; see, for example,
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen [1988] and Fazzari and Petersen [1993].
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in this sector. Finally, government regulations may restrict the
ability of certain social groups to invest in certain assets.2
We model this physical separation of savers and investors by
introducing an asset that we call active investment (e.g., starting a
ﬁrm) which has the highest return of all assets and which is only
accessible to already existing businesses and their owners and to
a ﬁxed fraction of the labor force. We measure the separation by a
constant µ which measures the share of labor income going to
those who can actively invest (say, the managerial elite).
The main contribution of the paper is the development of a
tractable framework for studying the business cycle implications
of this kind of separation between savers and investors. The ﬁrst
result in the paper tells us that a high degree of such separation
leads the economy to ﬂuctuate around its steady-state growth
path. More speciﬁcally, it is shown that under a condition that in
our model turns out to take the very simple form of µ ,n , implying
both a relatively high degree of physical separation of savers and
investors and a poorly functioning capital market, the economy
always converges to a cycle around its trend growth path unless µ
is very small (or n very large).
The logic behind the endogenous cycles is straightforward.
Periods of slow growth are periods when savings are plentiful
relative to the limited debt capacity of potential investors, which
implies a low demand for savings and therefore low equilibrium
interest rates. This in turn implies that the investors can retain a
high proportion of their proﬁts (since the interest rate and hence
the debt burden on investors is low), which allows them to rebuild
their reserves and debt capacity and expand their investment.
This, in turn, generates more proﬁts and more investment until,
eventually, planned investment runs ahead of savings forcing the
interest rates to rise. Now the debt burden on the investors is
going to be higher, retained earnings will be lower, and invest-
ment will collapse, taking us back to a period of slower growth.
It is worth noting that this endogenous cycle is a product of
two distinct forces. On the one hand, high investment begets high
proﬁts and high investment. On the other, high investment
pushes up interest rates and reduces future proﬁts and invest-
ment. The ﬁrst causes output to be positively serially correlated;
2. For example, in colonial India, under the Punjab Land Tenancy act, the
colonial administration in the Punjab restricted the right to own land to certain
‘‘peasant’’castes.
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which of these forces dominates, the overall correlation of output
may be positive or negative. In particular, we show that if credit
constraints are severe and the fraction of active investors is low,
then booms cannot last forever: in other words, the second force
will eventually exhaust the debt capacity of investors and push
the economy into recession.
It is also worth emphasizing that cyclical ﬂuctuations in this
world are always inefficient: the economy cycles because it has
phases when savings are underutilized in the sense of being
invested in an inferior asset. In this sense, our model partially
captures the Keynesian idea that slumps are associated with a
liquidity trap.3
The cycle, however, is just one of three possibilities: if n,µ, so
that the degree of separation is low, we have a permanent boom;
the economy converges to a stable growth path where all available
savings are always invested in the high-return activity. While if
either n is very high or µ is very low, the economy converges to a
permanent slump in the sense of permanently underutilizing its
saving.
Of these three cases the highest trend growth rates corre-
spond, not surprisingly, to the permanent boom case; in this case
the growth rate is exactly the Harrod-Domar growth rate. In both
other cases the trend growth rate is always lower than the
Harrod-Domar growth rate, but a priori we cannot tell which of
the two rates is higher.
These three types of economies also differ in their response to
shocks: where the degree of separation is low, that is, in what we
have called a permanent boom economy, the full effect of a
temporary productivity shock registers immediately in the out-
put. When the degree of separation is higher, responses to shocks
are more gradual, and therefore, there is more persistence in
changes in output.
A permanent positive productivity shock raises the growth
rate in a permanent boom economy, and the new higher growth
rate is achieved immediately. By contrast, in a permanent slump
economy the full impact of the shock on the growth rate comes
about only gradually. The effect in the cyclical economy turns out
3. However, since we do not have a notion of liquidity in our model, we cannot
capture the Keynesian idea that in a liquidity trap the inferior asset that savers
hold is also a very liquid asset.
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because one has to take account of the effect of higher interest
rates generated by the positive productivity shock on the length of
the subsequent slump. It turns out that in some cases a positive
productivity shock can actually lower the average growth rate by
prolonging the slump.
The overall picture that emerges from our analysis is that
economies with less developed ﬁnancial markets and a sharper
physical separation between savers and investors will tend to be
more volatile and to grow more slowly. For a number of obvious
reasons both of these dimensions of separation are likely to be
greater in emerging market economies (EMEs), which in turn
may explain why macroeconomic volatility tends to be larger in
these economies than in the more developed economies.4
However, there is at least some evidence that this kind of
mechanism based on the functioning of the credit market is also
relevant for understanding the business cycle properties of more
developed economies.
For example, we believe that our analysis in this paper and in
subsequent work by Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee [1998] may
shed some light on the case of advanced market economies such as
Finland, where ﬁnancial development (in terms of our parameter
n), however, is still lagging behind and which has experienced
high macroeconomic volatility over the past decade (see Honkapo-
hja and Koskela [1998]). And even in ﬁnancially developed
economies like the United States, the mechanism we describe in
this paper may remain pertinent for the case of small investors
whose investments turn out to be signiﬁcantly correlated with
current cash ﬂows (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1998]),
and who therefore constitute a less ﬁnancially developed enclave
with the U. S. economy. The case for a credit channel in the
transmission of shocks to the U. S. economy has been argued for in
various contributions going back at least to the work of Haberler
4. Some reasons why the extent of separation of savers and investors may be
especially large in EMEs include poor transportation facilities which exaggerate
physical distances and limit certain types of investment to those who live close
enough to the natural locale for the investment; badly deﬁned and poorly enforced
propertyrightsmakeloantransactionsharder;socialsegmentation,onthebasisof
caste and tribe, often acts to limit entry into speciﬁc industries; and high levels of
social and economic inequality might mean that only a small fraction of the
population has the wherewithal to be investors.
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Gertler.6
Given the inefficiency of cyclical ﬂuctuations in our model,
there is clearly a potential role for countercyclical macro policies.
Since slumps are times where there are some idle savings that are
not being used efficiently because of the limited debt capacity of
potential investors, a natural strategy for recovery is to issue
public debt in recessions in order to absorb those idle savings and
ﬁnance investment subsidies or tax cuts for businesses. We show
that under some conditions such policies can at the same time
restore maximum growth and raise the savers’welfare.
Of course, a different policy perspective on our model would
be to argue that it stresses the importance of structural reforms
that aim at reducing the extent of separation of savers and
investors. This is especially likely to be important in situations
where the appropriate countercyclical policies are difficult to
carry out (for example, because the extent of separation is
changing rapidly over time and in situations where countercycli-
cal policies have adverse distributional consequences—the poli-
cies suggested by our model always help investors, but sometimes
at the cost of savers). Structural reforms may in such cases be a
necessary condition for the success of stabilization policies.
Our model is far from being the ﬁrst that emphasizes the role
of the separation between savers and investors as a source of
macroeconomic volatility. This general point can be found in the
works of Keynes [1936], Harrod [1939], among others, but in their
models the primary source of instability is the exogenous instabil-
ity in the investment rate.
Goodwin’s [1967] model of growth cycles is closer to ours, in
that it also describes cycles as the outcome of a dynamic process
withtheimbalancebetweeninvestorsandsaverschangingendoge-
nouslyovertime,althoughGoodwin’smechanismoperatesthrough
the equilibrium wage rate rather than the equilibrium interest
rate (for some evidence that our mechanism is important in
practice, see subsection III.4). Despite this difference the two
stories are entirely consistent with each other and share the
common prediction that downturns in economic activity are
5. Who, in turn, refers to Hawtrey and Wicksell.
6. These authors have a number of papers of which perhaps the most
immediately relevant is their recent survey of the literature [Bernanke and
Gertler 1995a, 1995b).
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papers differ most is in the modeling style. Unlike ours, Goodwin’s
model has no explicit micro-foundations and therefore does not
allow for rigorous policy analysis and checks of robustness. In
Appendix 2 we show how our model can easily be extended in
order to offer a micro-founded version of a Goodwin cycle.
Our paper and all papers on the role of debt in the transmis-
sion of business cycles owe a lot to the seminal paper by Bernanke
and Gertler [1995a], which, in turn, was inﬂuenced by the much
older ideas of Fisher [1933] and his followers, on debt deﬂation.As
in Bernanke and Gertler the presence of debt and borrowing in
our model makes the effects of productivity and other shocks more
persistent than they would otherwise be and also induces a
multiplier with respect to these shocks. Where we go beyond
Bernanke and Gertler is in emphasizing the general equilibrium
effects of such shocks: a shock that increases proﬁts now will
increase debt capacity and therefore investment in the future, but
it will also raise interest rates and the debt burden which
discourages investment. Therefore, in the medium run, invest-
ment might go down rather than up as a result of the increase in
proﬁts. It is this general equilibrium mechanism that allows our
model, unlike that of Bernanke and Gertler, to have oscillations
and endogenous cycles.
General equilibrium effects also play a role in the paper by
Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] on the business cycle effects of
borrowing constraints. In their paper a shock to proﬁts raises
investment which, in turn, increases the price of collateral which
makes the investors (who already own collateral) richer and
induces more investment. Of course, this process is accompanied
by an increase in the debt burden, but the increase in the debt
burden is matched by the increase in proﬁts coming from the extra
investment that caused the debt to go up in the ﬁrst place: unlike
in our model there is no interest rate effect that would cause the
debt burden to go up disproportionately. Consequently, in their
basic model the credit market effects only amplify and draw out
the initial shock: there is no endogenous counteracting effect of
the kind that we emphasize and that give us the endogenous
oscillations.Suchacounteractingeffect,whichcausestheeconomy
to have persistent oscillations in response to a shock, does appear
in a generalized version of their model, but in order to have it, they
need to introduce lags in the response of investment to changes in
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clear to what extent it is the lags rather than the basic mecha-
nisms of the model that are driving the cycles.7 Moreover, they
only report damped oscillations and do not provide us with
conditions under which the model will converge to a limit cycle.
Finally, our focus on the interplay between credit imperfec-
tions and the dynamics of distribution relates this work to the
literature on inequality, credit-market imperfections, and growth
(see, e.g., Banerjee and Newman [1993], Galor and Zeira [1993],
Aghion and Bolton [1997], and Piketty [1997]). However, the
emphasis on short-run ﬂuctuations directs our attention toward a
very different kind of inequality than the one emphasized in this
literature. We ﬁnd that from the point of view of short-run
stability, it is the inequality between savers and investors, rather
than the inequality between the rich and the very poor (who
neither invest nor save very much) that matters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the basic
framework. In Section III the basic model is analyzed, and the
basic results about stability and the nature of the response to
shocks are derived. Section IV discusses the impact of government
policies on volatility and average growth.
II. BASIC FRAMEWORK
The economy has one nonproduced input (labor) and one
produced good, which serves both as a capital input and as a
consumption good. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor
at each period.
Technology. The production function for the one produced
good is F(K,L) 5 AKbL12b 5 Y. In order to focus our attention upon
the capital market equilibrium, we assume that the labor market
takes a very simple form: the wage rate is permanently equal to
7. Freixas and Rochet [1997] have a discussion of the Kiyotaki-Moore paper
where they claim that it can be adapted to have oscillations even without the lags,
by adding an alternative use for the collaterizable asset. In their version of the
model, as the amount of borrowing grows and more and more of the collaterizable
asset gets used in the production sector, less and less of it goes to the alternative
use. This reduces proﬁts because the alternative use is actually more proﬁtable
than production. However, this seems to rely on the investors not optimizing;
otherwise they would always put the asset to its most proﬁtable use rather than
use it for increasing production.
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that price.8 In equilibrium,
­F
­L
5 1 Þ L 5 ((1 2b )A)1/bK
Þ Y 5s K
with s5A((1 2b )A)(12b)/b).
This is an example of what has been called an AK model and
therefore will generate positive long-run growth. Also note that
the labor and capital shares of ﬁnal output are given by the usual
formulas: (­Y/­L)L 5 (1 2b )sK and (­Y/­K)K 5b s K.9
Investment Possibilities. Not everyone has direct access to
investments in production. Those who cannot invest directly in
production (the ‘‘noninvestors,’’ or the ‘‘lenders,’’ or ‘‘savers’’) can
either lend at the current interest rate r to those who can invest in
production (the ‘‘investors,’’ or the ‘‘borrowers’’) or invest in a
low-yield asset that yields a return s2, with s2 ,s 1 5b s .10 We will
think of this asset as storage, but it could as well be some other
production technology (or some government bond; see Section IV
below). In addition to ﬁrms’ owners, the investors’ class also
includes a ﬁxed fraction of the labor force (say, the managers who
have sufficient knowledge about direct investment opportunities),
and the size of this group is measured by its share µ in total labor
income. The case µ 5 0 is the case where all productive invest-
ment is carried out directly by businesses and their owners and
the ‘‘household sector’’ can only lend its savings to the ‘‘business
sector’’(or invest in the low-yield asset).At the other extreme, the
case µ 5 1 is the case where everyone can directly invest his own
8. Therefore, we are implicitly assuming that the size of the labor force grows
at least as fast as the capital stock, such that the wage rate is ﬁxed to one for
standard labor supply reasons (agents are prepared to sell their labor unit at any
price higher than or equal to one).
9. Instead of assuming an unlimited labor supply at price 1, one could also
assume a ﬁxed labor supply L0 and introduce an aggregate capital accumulation
externality a ` la Frankel [1962] or Romer [1986] in order to obtain an AK model
with steady-state long-run growth: if Y 5 AKbL12b Ka
g, where Ka is the aggregate
capital stock (the effects of which are not internalized by individual ﬁrms), then if
g51 2band L ; L0, we have Y 5s K, with s5AL0
12b, and the capital share
(respectively, the labor share) of output is again equal to bY (respectively,
(1 2b )Y). These alternative assumptions would leave our analysis of macroeco-
nomic volatility unaffected, while extending it beyond the Harrod-Domar case to
the case of more standardAK technologies.
10. We assume the ﬁnancial intermediation process between lenders and
investors to be perfectly competitive, so that lenders always get the full return to
their savings. This allows us to avoid dealing with the banking sector in what
follows.
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thus no separation between savers and investors.
Capital Market Imperfection. Due to standard incentive-
compatibility considerations, an investor with initial wealth W
can invest at most W/n, where 1/n.1 is a credit multiplier.11
Credit constraints vanish as v tends toward 0, while v 5 1i st h e
polar case where the credit market collapses and investors can
only invest their own wealth.
Determination of the Interest Rate. The interest rate is the
one price in this model that is determined endogenously. The
linearity of the production technology implies that the equilib-
rium interest rate will be exactly equal to the rate of return s1 5
bs whenever planned investment in production is higher than
aggregate savings, and it will drop down to s2 in the opposite case
(see below).12 Our results can be extended to a more general model
where the interest rate changes smoothly over time (see subsec-
tion III.4 below).
The Timing of Events. The timing of events within in each
period t is depicted in Figure I.
Borrowing and lending take place at the beginning of the
period (which we denote by t2), at an interest rate that is
11. An explicit microeconomic derivation of this (constant) credit multiplier is
developed in Appendix 1, where we also discuss the robustness of our analysis to
alternative microeconomic foundations whereby the multiplier n ends up depend-
ing upon the interest rate r. See also our discussion in subsection III.4 below.
12. Throughout the paper we will adopt the convention that interest rates as
well as the growth rates refer to the gross rate (i.e., one plus the net rate).
FIGURE I
The Timing
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investments and savings at t2.
Everything else occurs at the end of the period (which we
denote by t1): ﬁrst, the returns to investments are realized;
second, the repayment of debt from borrowers to lenders; third,
the consumption decisions and the savings decisions that in turn
will determine the total amount of available savings at the
beginning of next period (i.e., at (t 1 1)2).
Savings Behavior. For simplicity, we assume a linear saving
behavior: all agents save a ﬁxed fraction (1 2a ) of their total
end-of-period wealth and consume a ﬁxed fraction a (see subsec-
tion III.4 below for a discussion of alternative assumptions).
Now that the model has been fully laid out, we can analyze
the dynamics of the underlying economy and, in particular, try to
understand why the inequality in investment opportunities be-
tween investors and noninvestors, in other words the separation
between savings and investments, can generate macroeconomic
volatility.
III. THE MECHANICS OF THE MODEL
III.1. The Basic Dynamic Relationships
Let WB
t and WL
t denote the wealth of investors (borrowers)
and noninvestors (lenders) at the beginning of period (t 1 1). Total
savings from previous period t are by deﬁnition equal to
St 5 WB
t 1 WL
t .
Total planned investments in the high-yield activity at the
beginning of period (t 1 1) are equal to
It11
d 5 WB
t /n.
Note the following.
1. The interest rate rt11 in period (t 1 1) is equal to b s5s 1 if
It11
d . St (that is, whenever the investment capacity
of investors is higher than aggregate savings) and to s2 if
It11
d , St (that is, whenever the investment capacity of
investors is lower than aggregate savings).
2. Actual investment in the high-yield activity at date (t 1 1)
is equal to min (St,It11
d ), whereas investment in the low-
yield activity (with return s2) is equal to St 2 min (St,It11
d ).
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between actual investment in the high-yield activity and
their initial wealth WB
t .
During periods when investment demand is higher than
aggregate savings, all savings are invested in the high-yield
activity (with total return s) and the growth rate of the economy
takes its maximum value g* 5 (1 2a )s.13 We will call these
periods ‘‘booms.’’ Conversely, during periods when investment
demand is less than aggregate savings, a positive fraction of
aggregate savings is invested in the low-yield activity so that the
growth rate is smaller than g*. We will call these periods
‘‘slumps.’’ We can now obtain the following equations describing
the dynamic evolution of capital accumulation between two
consecutive periods. During a boom (i.e., if It11
d . St),
(B) WB
t11 5 (1 2a )[µ(1 2b )s(WB
t 1 WL
t )
1b s (WB
t 1 WL
t ) 2b s WL
t ]
WL
t11 5 (1 2a )[(1 2 µ)(1 2b )s(WB
t 1 WL
t ) 1b s WL
t ].
In other words, given that all available savings (WB
t 1 WL
t )
are invested in the high-yield activity during a boom, total
revenue from this activity is equal to s(WB
t 1 WL
t ). A fraction
(1 2b ) of that revenue remunerates the labor force, with inves-
tors (respectively, noninvestors) representing a fraction µ (respec-
tively, 1 2 µ) of the total labor share of output. Second, while
borrowers realize the yield rate of return bs on capital investment
(WB
t 1 WL
t ), they must repay the high interest rate r 5b son the
amount WL
t they have borrowed from the lenders (hence the term
2bsWL
t in the right-hand side of the ﬁrst equation, which
corresponds to the term bsWL
t in the right-hand side of the second
equation).
Similarly, during a slump (i.e., if It11
d , St),
(S) WB
t11 5 (1 2a )3µ(1 2b )s ·
1
n
WB
t 1b s
1
n
WB
t 2s 2 1
1
n
2 12WB
t4
WL
t11 5 (1 2a )3(1 2 µ)(1 2b )s ·
1
n
WB
t 1s 2WL
t4 .
Namely, given that only the amount WB
t /n can be invested in
13. g* is the standard Harrod-Domar growth rate, i.e., the product of the
savings rate by the output/capital ratio.
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revenue equal to sWB
t /n. A fraction (1 2b ) of that revenue
remunerates labor, with borrowers (respectively, lenders) getting
a fraction µ (respectively, 1 2 µ) of that revenue. The fraction b of
that revenue remunerates capital investment and thus accrues
entirely to the borrowers. However, borrowers must pay the
interest rate s2 on the amount (WB
t /n2WB
t ) they borrow from the
middle-class lenders. On the other hand, lenders realize the rate
of return s2 on their wealth WL
t , both by lending a fraction of it to
wealthy borrowers and by investing the complementary fraction
in the low-yield activity.14
Letting qt 5 St/It11
d denote the ratio of savings over planned
investments in the high-yield activity at the beginning of period
(t 1 1), simple manipulation of the above equations leads to
(B8)
1
qt11 5
µ(1 2b )
n
1b·
1
qt ,
when qt # 1 (i.e., when the economy is in a boom at the beginning
of period t 1 1) and
(S8) qt11 5
1
µ(1 2b )(s/n) 1 (1/n)bs 2 ((1/n) 2 1)s2
[(s2s 2) 1s 2qt],
when qt . 1 (i.e., when the economy is currently experiencing a
slump).
Equations (B8) and (S8) deﬁne a simple ﬁrst-order difference
equation which allows a complete characterization of the global
dynamics of the economy.
III.2. Slumps and Booms
Note ﬁrst that both curves (B8) and (S8) are monotonically
increasing and intersect the 45° degree line only once (from
above). Note also that the (B8)-curve always lies above the
(S8)-curveatqt51:qt11(qt 5 1,rt11 5s 1).qt11(qt 5 1,rt11 5s 2).15
14. They lend the amount (WB
t /n2WB
t ) to the high-yield investors and invest
the remaining amount WL
t 2 (WB
t /n2 WB
t ) in the low-yield activity.
15. The intuition for this is quite straightforward: borrowers beneﬁt from
lower interest rates at the expense of lenders. Therefore, the savings/investment
demand ratio is lower next period if the current interest rate rt11 is lower, for a
given allocation of funds (if qt 5 1, all savings are invested in the high-yield
activity, irrespective of whether rt11 5s 1 or s2). More formally, when qt 5 1,
qt11(qt 5 1,rt11 5s 2) 5
1
(µ(1 2b )/n) 1 (b/n) 2 ((1/n) 2 1)(s2/s)
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three possible rankings between 1, s, and b, where s and b are the
intersections of the (S8) and (B8) curves with the 45° line. These
are depicted in Figures II, III, and IV.
Figure II corresponds to the case where 1 . b(.s). In this
case, as is evident from the ﬁgure, the economy converges to a
permanent boom with qt = b. The long-run growth rate for the
economy is just the Harrod-Domar growth rate g* 5 (1 2a )s.
Simple manipulation of equation (B8) yields
b 5n /µ.
The condition b , 1 is therefore equivalent to n,µ. This
necessary and sufficient condition is very intuitive: a permanent
boom will occur when the fraction of the labor force that has direct
accesstoinvestmentsinproductionissufficientlylargetocompen-
sate for the borrowing constraints faced by these investors. This
condition ensures that in the long run the debt capacity of
investors will always be sufficient for all available savings to be
absorbed and invested in the high-yield activity. In particular, the
Harrod-Domar permanent boom regime will occur if credit con-
straints are negligible (n close to 0) or if all agents have direct
access to productive investments (µ close to 1). Conversely,
permanent booms will never occur if µ 5 0; i.e., if business proﬁts
are the only investible funds. This is because if µ 5 0, then the
investment capacity of the economy grows at rate (1 2a )bs while
savings grow at the higher rate (1 2a )s: the latter will therefore
always be in excess supply after some ﬁnite time.16 The condition
µ .nalso shows that both dimensions of separation between
investors and savers (i.e., n.0 and µ , 1) are necessary in order
to generate slumps in the long run.
Figure III corresponds to the case where 1 , s(,b). Here, the
economy always converges to a permanent slump (with qt = s),
and with a rate of growth that is less than the Harrod-Domar
, qt11(qt 5 1,rt11 5s 1) 5
1
(µ(1 2b )/n) 1b
.
(s1 5b s.s 2 implies that b,(b/n) 2 (1/n) 2 1)(s2/s)).
16. If µ . 0, then the investment capacity of the economy grows at rate
(1 2a ) ? (µ(1 2b )s)/v) 1b s ), which is smaller than the savings growth rate iff
µ ,n .
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s 5
(s2s 2)n
µ(1 2b )s1b s2s 2
.
The necessary and sufficient condition deﬁning the perma-
nent slump regime is then given by
s , 1, or equivalently, µ(1 2b ) 1b,n1
s2
s
(1 2n ).
This condition is also very intuitive: permanent slumps will
tend to occur when the credit multiplier is small (n high) and few
people have direct access to investments in production (µ small).
Note also that permanent slumps are more likely to occur if s2/s is
high: a high s2/s ratio implies high debt repayment/proﬁt ratios
for investors and therefore makes it less likely that their debt
capacity will ever be able to absorb all available savings (the same
reasoning applies if the capital share b is low). The expression for
FIGURE II
The Permanent Boom Regime
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with the permanent slump regime: in steady state a fraction 1/s of
aggregate savings is invested in the high-yield activity (with
return s), while the remaining fraction 1 2 1/s is invested in the
low-yield activity (with return s2), so that the steady-state growth
rate gs is given by
gs 5 (1 2a )1
1
s
s111 2
1
s2 s22 (,(1 2a )s)
5 (1 2a )1s2 1
µ(1 2b )s1b s2s 2
n 2 .
This is always lower than the Harrod-Domar growth rate.
Figure IV corresponds to the case where s , 1 , b. In this case
the ﬁgure shows that the economy keeps moving back and forth
between booms and slumps and will eventually converge to a
limit-cycle. The two conditions for this case are b1(1 2b )µ .n1
FIGURE III
The Permanent Slump Regime
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economy with a very high degree of separation between savers
and investors as well as an economy where both groups are
extremely well integrated will not cycle: in the ﬁrst case there will
be a permanent slump and in the second a permanent boom.17 It is
only in the intermediate case where the separation is large but not
too large that we observe short-run instability. Note that short-
run instability is associated with the economy performing below
its potential (as measured by growth rates), since slumps are
phases where some of the capital is put to less than optimal use:
the growth rate is equal to the Harrod-Domar growth rate during
booms (when qt , 1) but is strictly below the Harrod-Domar
growth rate during recessions (when qt . 1).
17. In particular, a highly underdeveloped economy where businesses rely
entirely on their own retained earnings to invest will not cycle.
FIGURE IV
The Cycles Regime
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depicted in Figure IV. Figures V and VI depict n . 2-cycles, with
either a debt-buildup phase during which borrowers are getting
poor relative to creditors (Figure V)18 or a proﬁt-reconstitution
phase during which borrowers are getting richer relative to
creditors—both because creditors get the low rate s2 on their
savings and because borrowings are low during slumps (Figure
VI).19 The relative length of boom (i.e., debt buildup) and slump
(i.e., proﬁt reconstitution) phases will depend upon the basic
parameters of the model: expansionary phases with debt buildup
will last longer when the slope of the (B8) curve at the point b is
close to 1 (or equivalently, when b is close to 1); on the other hand,
18. This case is more likely to arise when the slope of the (B8)-curve is
sufficiently close to 1 at b; that is, when b is close to 1.
19. This case is more likely to arise when the slope of the (S8)-curve is
sufficiently close to 1; i.e., when
(1/n)[s2 2 (µ(1 2b ) 1b )]
is sufficiently small.
FIGURE V
Prolonged Boom (Debt Buildup)
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1376
Page1376
@xyserv1/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec114-4/DIV_088a01 dansthe length of recession phases will go up when the slope of the
(S8)-curve gets closer to 1 (in particular when n or s2 is large as in
Figure VI).
Intuitively, during an expansionary phase, investment (and
therefore borrowings) will go up since output and proﬁts, and
therefore the borrowing capacity of investors, are growing. And
the higher the share of capital b in the revenue from the
high-yield activity, the more will proﬁts increase over time and
therefore the longer will the investors’borrowing capacity keep on
absorbing total savings. Hence the higher b, the longer the debt
buildup phases. On the other hand, the larger s2 or n, the larger
the ratio of savings over planned investment when the economy
enters a recession; this, together with the fact that investors must
repay a higher interest rate s2 to their lenders throughout the
recession, implies that it will take longer before the borrowing
capacity of investors can again absorb the totality of savings (at
which point the economy can reenter a boom).
FIGURE VI
Prolonged Recession (Proﬁt Reconstitution)
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How does such an economy react to shocks? In order to
answer this question, we ﬁrst look at how the shocks move the two
curves (B8) and (S8). We will focus on two kinds of shocks: shocks to
s, which are naturally interpreted as productivity shocks and
shocks to s2, which may be thought of either as productivity
shocks (for example, if this asset is thought of as home production)
or as policy shocks (for example, if this asset is thought of as
money, the shock could be a change in the variance of the inﬂation
rate).
It is easy to see from equation B8 that the curve (B8)i s
unaffected by changes in s and s2. This should be intuitive: an
increase in s during a boom increases both the return to invest-
ment and the return on savings exactly in the same proportion
and therefore does not affect the distribution of wealth between
the savers and investors (measured by q). A change in s2 has no
effect because in a boom no one puts his money in the inferior
asset.
Atrivial calculation establishes that in the range in which the
(S8) curve is relevant (i.e., as long as q . 1), an increase in s and a
fall in s2 lowers the (S8) curve. This too should be intuitive: in a
slump an increase in s beneﬁts the investors but not the savers,
while a fall in s2 hurts the savers while beneﬁting the investors.
It follows that if the economy is in a permanent boom, neither
a temporary nor a permanent shock to productivity (i.e., s going
up) has any effect on the distribution of wealth between savers
and investors. It does of course have an effect on the rate of
growth: in periods where s is higher, the growth rate will be
proportionally higher. However, because there is no effect on q, the
entire effect on the growth rate is registered in the period of the
shock. In other words, if the shock is permanent, the economy
immediately goes to its steady-state growth rate; and if it is
temporary, after the shock, the economy grows at the same rate as
before the shock, albeit starting at a higher level of GNP. Changes
in s2 have no effect for obvious reasons. Figure VIIa (respectively,
VIIb) describes the dynamic effects of a permanent (respectively,
temporary) increase in s on the growth rate when the economy
is—and remains—in a permanent boom.20
The picture in a permanent slump economy is quite different.
20. In this and the following ﬁgures, we assume for simplicity that the
economy is initially at a steady state.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1378
Page1378
@xyserv1/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec114-4/DIV_088a01 dansFIGURE VIIa
Effect of a Permanent Increase in s on a Booming Economy
FIGURE VIIb
Effect of a Temporary Increase in s on a Booming Economy
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function of s but a decreasing function of s2: that is, the positive
effect of a higher s2 on the returns to the fraction of savings that
are not invested in the high-yield activity is more than offset by
the negative effect of a higher s2 on debt repayments and
therefore on the steady-state debt capacity of investors. Taxing s2
and throwing the tax revenues away would actually increase the
long-run growth rate!21
The process of convergence to the new steady state is also
quite different from that in a permanent boom economy.As can be
seen from Figure VIIIa, a permanent rise in s or a permanent fall
in s2 shifts the (S8) curve downward. As a result, q falls initially
and then continues to fall as it converges toward its steady-state
level. Since, ceteris paribus, a fall in q raises the growth rate22 by
shifting the distribution of wealth toward the investors, the initial
rise in s or fall in s2 will end up having both a direct and indirect
positive effect on the growth rate, as shown in Figure VIIIb.
Similarly, Figures IXa and IXb show that the growth-
enhancing effects of a one-period increase in s or a one-period fall
in s2 will also persist beyond the period of the shock. Moreover,
there is the possibility of a multiplier: the output effect of a shock
may be larger after the shock itself has died out and the economy
has gone back to its original parameters.23 This is again due to the
fact that the shock shifts the distribution of wealth in favor the
21. Alternatively, the government could impose interest rate ceilings so as to
push the interest rate below s2 (see Section IV below).
22. The growth rate in a slump period is given by (1 2a )((s/q) 1 (1 2
(1/q)s2).
23. Let Y0 denote the average output of the economy before the shock, Y1
denote the average output in the period when the shock hits, and Y2 denote the
average output in the following period right after the productivity parameter s has
come back to its initial value.Assume that the economy is initially in a permanent
slump. For a sufficiently small initial increase in productivity froms to s1ds,o n e
can show that
Y2
Y1
5
1
q1
s111 2
1
q12 s2
.
Y1
Y0
5
1
q0
(s1ds) 1 11 2
1
q02 s2 . 1,
where q0 and q1 are the values of q before and right after the shock; i.e.,
q0 5g(s)·[ s2s 21s 2q0] 5 s
and
q1 5g(s1ds)[s1ds2s 2 1s 2q0],
where g(s) is the ﬁrst term in the expression for qt11 in equation (S8) above.
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FIGURE VIIIb
FIGURE VIII: Effect of a Permanent Increase in s on Economy in Slump
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FIGURE IXb
FIGURE IX: Effect of a Temporary Increase in s on Economy in Slump
gs(t) responds nonmonotonically to temporary increase in s, but it remains
permanently above the preshock steady-state level.
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dies away gradually.
The effects of shocks in a cyclical economy are, for obvious
reasons, more complex. In particular, an increase in s has an
ambiguous effect on average growth in this case: on the one hand,
it increases growth during booms, but on the other hand, investors
end up accumulating a higher debt burden during booms, which
causes recessions to be more severe (i.e., with higher q ratios in
recessions). The overall effect on average growth is unclear in
general. However, for the same reasons as in the permanent
slump regime, an increase in s2 will have an unambiguously
negative effect on average growth: a higher s2 leads to higher debt
repayments during slumps and therefore both to lower growth
during and also to longer periods of slumps.
The process of convergence to the new cycle after a permanent
shock is potentially quite complicated (as the reader can readily
verify by moving the (S8) curve in Figures IV, V, or VI) and deﬁes a
straightforwardclassiﬁcation.However,whatremainsunambigu-
ously true is that unlike in the permanent boom case, the growth
rate will only gradually adjust to its new steady-state level.
The above analysis ruled out the possibility that the shock
results in shifting the economy from one of our regimes to another.
As is evident from the condition for the cycling case, b1(1 2
b)µ .n1(s2/s)(1 2n ), high values of s and low values of s2, tend
to move the economy away from a permanent slump toward a
cycle. This is not necessarily a good thing: it turns out that an
increase in s can actually reduce average growth by forcing the
economy to shift from a permanent slump regime to a cyclical
regime because at least over some open parameter interval, it is
better never to have a boom than to have it some of the time.24
III.4 Robustness of our Results
Our results are derived in an exceedingly pared-down model,
and it is legitimate to wonder whether these results would survive
24. Namely, assume that µ ,nand consider s5s * such that µ(1 2b ) 1b5
n1(s2/s*)(1 2n ). If s,s *, the economy is in a permanent slump regime.As s =
s*, the permanent slump growth rate increases: gs = g* 5 (1 2a )s. But if s goes
above s*, then the economy exits the permanent slump regime and begins to cycle;
that is, the average growth rate falls below its Harrod-Domar value. It follows that
at least over some range [s*,s* 1e ], the average growth rate is a decreasing
function of s (although there need not exist any discontinuity in average growth
rates). For the same reasons, the average growth rate is an increasing function of
s2 at least over some range [s* 2 2e ,s* 2], in the region where an increase in s2 shifts
the economy from a cyclical regime to a permanent slump.
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emphasizing the directions in which the model can be extended
without losing our basic results.
1. In the present version of the model, the equilibrium
interest rate r ﬂuctuates discontinuously between one high value
and one low value. In a previous version of the paper we
constructed a version of the model where investors can choose
among a continuum of technologies and therefore where the
equilibrium interest rate can take on a continuum of values and
showed that we still get cycles.
2. If consumption-savings decisions were taken at the begin-
ning of the period instead of at the end, an expected fall in interest
rates would reduce savings, limiting the fall in interest rates and
thereby limiting the extent of ﬂuctuation. However, if this were to
eliminate all ﬂuctuations, the interest elasticity of savings would
have to be quite high, which it does not seem to be [Attanasio and
Weber 1993]. The same comment applies to whether our result
will change if savers are forward-looking.
3. Throughout our analysis in this paper, we have assumed
that individuals with investment opportunities have the same
propensity to consume as those with no investment opportunities.
Introducing different savings rates (1 2a L) and (1 2a B) for
lenders and borrowers would slightly complicate the analysis of
the model, but the essential conclusions would be unchanged.
Moreover, using the fact that the slopes of the (B8) and (S8) curves
are increasing functions of the ratio (1 2a L)/(1 2a B), one can
show25 (i) if 1 2a B 9 1 2a L, then the economy converges to a
permanent slump as borrowers’ investment can never absorb the
total amount of lenders’ savings; (ii) if 1 2a L 9 1 2a B, then the
economy converges to a permanent boom, as borrowers’ invest-
ment capacity tends always to be greater than aggregate savings
(WB/g.WB 1 WL)); (iii) in the intermediate case where (1 2a L)
and (1 2a B) are of comparable magnitudes, the economy will
converge to a limit cycle for suitable values of the parameters. In
this case we can analyze how the characteristics of the limit cycle
are affected by the relative savings rates of lenders and borrowers.
Intuitively, if 1 2a B is relatively small compared with 1 2a L, then
booms should be of short duration, and slumps should be long-
lasting, as it should take a while before borrowers can reconstitute
their investment capacity following a credit crunch. Conversely, if
25. The reader can verify this by looking back at Figures V and VI.
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and slumps will be short.
4. Even if investors were long-lived instead of living for just
one period, in our model they never have a reason to postpone
investment since investment always earns a higher return than
the cost of capital (r #s 1). That is, while slumps are indeed the
best period to invest (interest rates are low), investors have no
reason to delay their investment until the next slump because
they will always have more money to invest next period if they
invest today.26
5. Our results clearly depend on the interest rate being
endogenous and not given from outside, as it might be, for
example, in a small open economy. However, this seems a reason-
able approximation to the reality in many economies (see Feld-
stein and Horioka [1980] for evidence showing that capital tends
not to move across borders). Furthermore, as we show in Aghion,
Bacchetta, and Banerjee [1998], while opening a small economy
with credit-constrained investors to foreign borrowing and lend-
ing, has the obvious effect of stabilizing interest rate movements,
it may still destabilize the economy by exacerbating movements in
the real exchange rate.27
6. Throughout our analysis, we have taken the credit-
multiplier 1/n to be independent of the level of interest rates. In
Appendix 1 we provide an explicit microeconomic derivation of
this constant credit-multiplier, based on ex post moral hazard on
the part of the borrower, combined with an appropriate choice of
the lenders’ monitoring technology. It is also possible to derive a
credit multiplier from an ex ante moral hazard story a `l a
26. On the other hand, forward-looking ﬁrms may tend to accumulate savings
at a higher rate during booms (e.g., by cutting dividends) in order to expand their
investment in slumps. This would also tend to reduce the amplitude of the
ﬂuctuations, but it should not eliminate all ﬂuctuations unless the shareholders of
the ﬁrm are extremely patient.
27. The underlying mechanism is similar to the one described in this paper,
except that the pecuniary externality which serves as the transmission variable
for generating ﬂuctuations, is the real exchange rate, deﬁned as the price of
nontradable goods in terms of the tradable good. More speciﬁcally, the basic
mechanism inAghion, Banerjee, and Bacchetta [1998] can be described as follows:
suppose that high-yield investments in the domestic economy require the use of
nontradable goods (such as real estate) as inputs to produce tradable goods. Then
during a boom the domestic demand for nontradable goods keeps going up as
high-yield investments build up, and thus so does the price of nontradables
relative to that of tradables. This, together with the accumulation of debt that still
goes on during booms, will eventually squeeze investors’ borrowing capacity and
therefore the demand for nontradable goods. At this point, the economy experi-
ences a slump in which the price of nontradable goods collapses, and lendable
funds ﬂow out of the country.
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increases with the interest rate r. This, in turn, would tend to
dampen investors debt buildup during booms and thereby reduce
the magnitude of subsequent slumps. However, one can show that
the occurrence of cyclical (or volatile) growth patterns is still
preserved in this case so long as n(r) does not increase too rapidly
with r.28
7. We show in Appendix 1 that our results are also robust to
allowing investors and savers to write long-term debt contracts.
Intuitively a long-term contract may allow borrowers to postpone
a part of the repayment on their debt to periods when they expect
to be relatively cash rich and thereby limit the variation in qt.W e
show in Appendix 1 that while this intuition is correct, the
economy will continue to have cycles under conditions that are
somewhat stronger than those assumed in our basic model.29
8. Two empirical predictions that emerge from our analysis
are, ﬁrst that the ratio of debt-obligations over cash ﬂow should
peak toward the end of booms, and second that the real interest
rate paid by ﬁrms should be strongly procyclical. The ﬁrst
prediction appears to be directly and strongly supported by
existing empirical evidence (e.g., see Eckstein and Sinai [1986]
and Bernanke and Gertler [1995b]). The evidence on the second
prediction, however, is less clear. The existing interest rate data
for most developed countries show that the real interest rates on
bonds of various maturities are only weakly procyclical (nominal
rates, on the other hand, are strongly procyclical). On the other
hand, it is well-known that rates on short-term debt always pass
above long rates during booms,30 which, given the fact that the
share of short-term debt tends to go up at the end of booms,31
implies that the average interest rate paid by ﬁrms actually varies
more strongly with the business cycle than either the long or the
short rate.32
However, even if one accepts that the movements in interest
28. This, in turn, is automatically the case in the Holmstrom-Tirole model
when the marginal efficiency of effort, measured by the ratio of the increase in the
probability of success over the effort cost required to achieve such an increase, is
not too high.
29. Actually this result assumes that long-term contracts are no harder to
enforce than short-term contracts. The conditions under which the economy cycles
would be weaker if we were prepared to make the reasonable alternative
assumption that long-term contracts are harder to enforce.
30. On this point see Stock and Watson [1997].
31. See Friedman and Kuttner [1993a, 1993b] for evidence on the shifts in the
composition of ﬁrms’debt portfolios along the business cycle.
32. Friedman and Kuttner [1993a, 1993b] make a similar point.
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by the mechanism described here: it is possible, for example, that
procyclical movements in interest costs are simply a result of
monetary policy.33 One possible way to test our model while
controlling for variations in the stance of monetary policy, is to
look at interest rate spreads over the cycle. For example, Stock
and Watson [1997] show that the spread between rates on
unsecured commercial paper and the rate on (nondefaulting)
treasury bills, increases sharply toward the end of booms, and
then decreases during slumps.34 This is consistent with our model
where one can interpret s2 as the rate of interest on government
bonds (assuming that the supply of bonds is inﬁnitely elastic),
while r is the interest rate on commercial paper.
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS
What can a government do in the context of our model in
order to limit the extent of cyclical ﬂuctuations and the length of
suboptimal growth periods associated to slumps?
The ultimate source of the instability and the associated
inefficiency highlighted in this paper is inequality in the access to
the most rewarding investment opportunities—what we have
called dualism.An obvious policy response would be to reduce the
extent of dualism in the economy: if the government could
improve access to credit (reduce n) or access to direct investment
opportunities in production (increase µ) so that µ .n , then the
economy would switch to a regime of permanent boom and no
slump would ever occur in the long run (Figure III). This argues
for emphasizing policies which improve credit access, create
infrastructure and human capital in areas where such things are
missing and reduce barriers to entry. Therefore, our model
suggests that the issue of macroeconomic stabilization should not
be examined separately from the issue of structural reforms:
removing the institutional obstacles and rigidities that separate
savers and investors can promote growth, stability, and equity at
the same time.
It is worth stressing that the immediate policy prescription of
33. This is, for example, the view taken by Eckstein and Sinai [1982].
34. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1998] perform a VAR estimation of the
impulse response to monetary shocks, and ﬁnd that the spread between the rates
on commercial paper and on T-bills widens in response to a negative monetary
shock.
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ties for savers, which is not the same thing as the more broad-
based promotion of equity emphasized, for example, in many of
the recent papers on inequality and growth.35 The difference
comes from the fact that the people who have the most savings to
invest are not necessarily poor and probably do not include the
very poor: policies that are targeted at savers may not promote
overall equity at least in the short run.36
However, such structural policies may be difficult to imple-
ment (especially in the short run), and in some cases they are just
not feasible: governments cannot simply decide that access to
credit and investment opportunities should be extended. Interest-
ingly, our model also allows us to explore the effects of more
conventional countercyclical macroeconomic policies. Our theory
of business ﬂuctuations describes slumps as periods where a
positive fraction of savings are not being used efficiently (‘‘idle’’
savings) because of the investors’ limited borrowing capacity.
Assuming that the structural parameters of the model cannot be
changed, the obvious way to prevent the occurrence of recessions
would be to transfer those idle savings from savers to investors
whenever necessary. That is, if at the beginning of some period t
the investment capacity WB
t /n of investors is smaller than the
total amount WL
t 1 WB
t of available savings (i.e., qt21 5n (WL
t 1
WB
t )/ WB
t . 1), then in order to achieve the Harrod-Domar rate of
growth it is sufficient to redistribute wealth dW from savers to
investors such that
(WB
t 1 dW)/n5WL
t 1 WB
t .
This policy ensures that all available savings will be invested
in the high-yield activity, and therefore that output will grow at
rate (1 2a )s. Moreover, note that such a growth-enhancing
countercyclicalpolicydoesnotnecessarilyentailnegativedistribu-
tive consequences for savers. First, the wealth transfer dW will
boost the demand for investment credit and therefore will raise
the equilibrium interest rate from its depressed value s2 to its
high value s1 5b s.s 2. Therefore, the interest income of savers
shifts from s2WL
t to s1(WL
t 2 dW). In particular, if the required
35. See Be ￿nabou [1996] for a survey.
36. Nothing in our model would change if we added a class of poor agents in
the economy who never save anything and therefore have no wealth whatsoever,
although this would increase inequality as it is usually measured. This distin-
guishes our model from political economy models in which the have-nots often play
a crucial role.
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severe or, more formally, if we start with qt21 close to 1), then the
interest income of savers is higher with the expansionary wealth
transfer dW than without it, especially if s2 is small relative
to s1.37
In addition, if the wage rate in this economy has an efficiency
wage component (so that employed workers earn some rents) the
wealth transfer dW can also beneﬁt the noninvestors because of
its expansionary effects on the labor market. The explicit calcula-
tions for this case are given in a previous version of this paper.
In practice, a countercyclical wealth transfer policy need not
take the form of redistributive wealth taxation: the same goals
can be achieved more easily through expansionary monetary and
ﬁscal policies. One natural interpretation of expansionary mone-
tary policy in the context of our model is that during periods where
the limited borrowing capacity of investors forces the economy to
enter in a recession, monetary authorities may decide to print
money and give it to overindebted businesses. Given the resulting
increase in the price level, this is equivalent to a real transfer dW
from savers to investors, and will have the same effects as
described above.38
Our model also delivers a very natural interpretation of
countercyclical ﬁscal policies: since slumps are periods with idle
savings, governments can promote recovery by issuing public debt
in order to absorb those idle savings and ﬁnance investment
subsidies (or tax cuts for businesses). That is, at the beginning of
any period t, where there are excess savings and the economy is
about to enter a recession (qt21 . 1), the government should issue
new public debt dB and use the proceeds to ﬁnance investment
subsidies or tax cuts dT for investors. As long as government
bonds yield a return at least equal to s2, savers will be willing to
lend their money to the government in order to ﬁnance this wealth
transfer to investors. If public debt repayment at the end of the
37. The reason why private actors do not implement this wealth transfer
themselves is obviously because in this perfectly competitive environment they do
not internalize the aggregate effect of such transfers on the price of capital. Note
also that this interest rate effect is not always strong enough to compensate the
savers for the extra taxes they pay: for example, if n51, i.e., if the savers need to
transfer all their wealth to investors in order to ensure Harrod-Domar growth,
then their interest income will unambiguously fall.
38. Although this crude type of monetary policy is by no means unheard of,
this is not the way modern central banks usually intervene (at least in western
countries). Qualitatively, it is likely, however, that more standard interventions
(such as lowering the discount rate below the equilibrium interest rate level) will
also result in the same net real transfer from lenders to borrowers.
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clical ﬁscal policy is equivalent to a direct wealth transfer dW
from savers to investors. In fact, in the extreme case where the
increase dB in public debt at t2 used to ﬁnance the investment
subsidy or tax cut dW 5 dB is paid back at t1 by a tax hike dT 5
s2dB falling entirely on the labor income or interest income of
savers, both policies are exactly equivalent. In particular, under
the conditions described above, such a countercyclical ﬁscal policy
can be in everybody’s interest (including the savers) because of its
expansionary effects on both interest and labor income.39
Finally, note that such a countercyclical transfer policy may
have to be permanently sustained. In particular, when the
government tries to prevent a recession at t2 by lowering the
savings/investment ratio qt21 from its laissez-faire value (q ˜ . 1) to
1 (through the wealth transfer dW), the equilibrium interest rate
goes up from rt 5s 2 to rt 5s 1, which in turn implies that the
savings/investment ratio qt next period will be higher than 1.40 In
other words, if the government stops intervening in period t 1 1,
the economy will fall into a recession in the following period: the
effect of the period-t countercyclical policy is then just to postpone
the recession from period t to period t 1 1. In order to guarantee
permanent Harrod-Domar growth rates (and to raise everybody’s
welfare under the conditions described above), the government
will need to implement a permanent policy regime of wealth
transfers from savers to investors at the beginning of each period
(e.g., via investment subsidies). One alternative strategy would be
to overshoot in period t2, i.e., to implement a wealth transfer dW
higher than the required minimum amount, so as to push qt21
below 1 and thereby ensure that the boom will continue in period
t 1 1. This would allow the government to achieve a permanently
high growth rate through policy interventions that remain only
39. If the government had a higher administrative and legal ability than
lenders in terms of enforcing debt repayments, then an expansionary ﬁscal policy
would be in the savers’ interest even in the absence of the induced expansionary
effects on interest and labor income: public debt could be paid back at t1 by raising
taxes only on investors, which in effect would amount to substitute public lending
to investors for incentive-constrained private lending. However, if the government
faces the same incentive constraints as private lenders, this is not feasible. For
example, in the context of the simple credit market model described inAppendix 1,
a tax on investors’ income would induce investors to default in case the tax is too
high, and in any case would amount to a reduction in s and therefore to a lower
credit multiplier (unless the government can tax investors while making sure that
they do not shirk on their other obligations).
40. So long as we were not in a permanent boom regime (in which case there is
no policy issue), qt11(qt 5 1,rt11 5s 1) . 1 (see Section III and Figures II–IV).
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at period t2 together with the wealth transfer dW: if the govern-
ment can ensure that the interest rate paid by investors does not
go up all the way to s1, then the boom could be maintained forever
without further policy interventions.41
APPENDIX 1 :AM ODEL OF THE CAPITAL MARKET
Basic Model
In this subsection we outline a simple microeconomic model of
(imperfect) lending that generates a constant credit multiplier 1/n
of the kind assumed in the paper.
Consider a borrower who needs to invest W 1 L 5 I in the
high-yield technology, where W denotes his/her initial wealth and
L his/her requested loan. The source of capital market imperfec-
tion is ex post moral hazard and costly state veriﬁcation. Namely,
once the return s(W 1 L) is realized, the borrower can either
repay immediately and get a net income equal to s(W 1 L) 2 rL,
or he/she can stall. Stalling revenues away from the lender has a
cost to the borrower (who has to keep ahead of the lender), and let
this cost be a ﬁxed proportion t of total revenues. Finally,
whenever the borrower defaults on his/her repayment obligation,
the lender may still invest effort into debt collection. Speciﬁcally,
assume that a lender who incurs a nonmonetary effort cost
L · C(p) has probability p of collecting her due repayment r · L.42
41. In the case of persistent volatility (Figure IV), we have qt11(qt 5 1,
rt11 5s 1) . 1 and qt11(qt 5 1,rt11 5s 2) , 1 (see Section III). By continuity, it
follows that there exists some interest rate r* [ ]s2, s1[ such that qt11(qt 5 1,
rt11 5 r*) 5 1. If the government sets an interest rate ceiling less than or equal to
r*, the economy will remain in a permanent boom. In the case of a permanent
slump regime (Figure III), the government would need to set an interest rate
ceiling below s2. Interest rate ceilings in the presence of excess demand for
investible funds can obviously entail nonnegligible costs: when it is enforced
successfully, we risk losing the beneﬁts of the price as a screening device (in the
model everyone is identical, but in the world some investors are better than others
and the price mechanism plays an important screening role).
42. Here, we are implicitly assuming that debt repudiation is not veriﬁable by
outsiders, so that the lender’s ex post revenue cannot be made contingent upon
whether default took place or not. This in turn explains why the lender cannot
collect more than r · L, even following a strategic default by the borrower.
Alternatively, if we had assumed that lenders can sign debt contracts allowing
them to collect everything in case of strategic default (and successful monitoring),
then the credit multiplier would always be a declining function of the interest rate
(e.g., as in Holmstrom and Tirole [1995]) instead of being constant as in our model
in this paper. As we argue below, having n increase with r would not dramatically
affect our analysis.
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borrower will decide not to (strategically) default if and only if
s1(L 1 W) 2 rL $s 1(1 2t )(L 1 W) 2 prL,
or equivalently
(A1) L 1 W #
W
1 2 (s1t)/(r(1 2 p))
.
Now, turning to the choice of the optimal monitoring policy p,
the lender will solve
max
p
5p·r L2 L·C(p)6,
so her optimal choice of p is given by the ﬁrst-order condition,
r 5 C8(p).
In the special case, where C(p) 52c ·l n( 12 p), we obtain
r 5 c/(1 2 p),
sothattheincentive-compatibilityconstraint(A1)becomessimply
L 1 W 5 I # (1/n)·W,
where n51 2 (s1t/c) is indeed independent of the interest rate.
The case where the credit multiplier 1/n is constant is clearly
a knife-edged case, and departing from the monitoring cost
function C(p) 52 c ·l n( 12 p), one can get this multiplier to
increase or decrease with r.I f1 / n increases with r, then the
interest rate will increase during booms and then drop down to s2
as investment demand falls below savings (which in turn will
happen sooner than before as debt-repayment obligations build
up faster than in the case where n is constant). On the other hand,
if 1/n decreases with r, then the interest rate will decrease during
booms which in turn will delay (and sometimes preclude43) the
occurrence of recessions. For example, if C(p) 5 cp2/2, we obtain
the ﬁrst-order condition,
r(1 2 p) 5 r 2 (r2/c),
so that the incentive constraint (A1) becomes
L 1 W # (1/n(r)) · W,
43. Namely, when the interest rate decreases sufficiently rapidly during
booms.
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n(r) 5 1 2
s1t
r 2 (r2/c)
is increasing in r whenever r . (c/2), thus in particular when
s2 . (c/2).
On the other hand, if C(p) 5 (c(1 2 p)12u)/(1 2u ) with u,1,
we have
(W)/(L 1 W) 5n (r) 5 1 2t r(12u)/uc1/u,
which is decreasing in r, so that 1/n(r) increases in r.
Remark 1. If credit rationing was due to ex ante rather than
to ex post moral hazard (e.g., as formalized in Holmstrom and
Tirole [1997]), then n(r) would increase with r, but one can show
that it will not increase too rapidly when the marginal efficiency of
effort, measured by the ratio of the increase in the probability of
success over the effort cost required to achieve such an increase, is
not too high. The occurrence of cyclical (or volatile) growth
patterns will then be preserved.
Remark 2. One can interpret the increasing relationship
between n and r in Holmstrom and Tirole [1997] as a wealth effect:
namely, the lower the interest rate r, the higher the discounted
value of future (i.e., end-of-period) proﬁts and therefore the higher
the current borrowing capacity of investors. Our microeconomic
derivation of a constant multiplier 1/n eliminates this wealth
effect by introducing a second effect that offsets it exactly. Namely,
a lower interest rate reduces the per dollar beneﬁt of lenders’ ex
post monitoring effort in collecting debt-repayment from their
borrowers. This in turn reduces the maximum amount L which
lenders are willing to lend to borrowers with given current wealth
W; i.e. it reduces the credit multiplier 1/n. Our choice of ex post
monitoring technology C(p) 52c ·l n( 12 p) generates a con-
stant multiplier n by having the above two effects of r on investors’
borrowing capacity exactly cancel out.
Long-Term Debt Contracts
In this subsection we investigate the effects of introducing
long-term credit contracts into our basic model. Intuitively, a
long-term contract may allow borrowers to postpone a part of the
repayment on their debt to periods when they expect to be
relatively cash rich and thereby limit the variation in qt. Here we
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cycle we get in our basic model.
Consider an extension of the above model where agents live
for two periods instead of one period but each new generation is
only born when the previous generation dies (i.e., it is a nonover-
lapping generation model). For simplicity we also assume (a) that
in the absence of long-term lending, the economy converges to a
two-cycle; (b) that agents (borrowers and lenders) do not care
about consumption smoothing and therefore may as well consume
everything at the end of their two-period life. During a current
boom, young borrowers might then be interested in signing a
two-period debt contract with their lending counterparts whereby
a ‘‘current’’rate r1 ,s 1 would be paid at the end of the ﬁrst period
and a future rate r2 .s 2 would be paid at the end of the second
period. Borrowers may also engage in further short-term borrow-
ing during the second period.
The borrower’s incentive constraint at the end of the ﬁrst
period will be
(A2) s1(L1 1 W) 2 r1L1 $s 1(1 2t )(L1 1 W) 2 pr1L1,
where L1 is the long-term debt contracted at the beginning of
period 1 and where r1(1 2 p) 5 c under the same monitoring
technology as the one postulated in the above subsection.
The above incentive-constraint can then be reexpressed as in
(i) above, namely,
(A28) L1 5 ((1/n) 2 1)W,
where n51 2 (s1t)/c.
The borrower’s accumulated cash net of current debt repay-
ment—at the end of period 1—will be equal to
W ˆ 5s 1W 1 (s1 2 r1)L1.
However, the borrower will not be able to invest up to the amount
W ˆ /n simply because W ˆ does not reﬂect his true wealth at the
beginning of period 2. Short-term lenders in period 2 will indeed
take into account the existence of further outstanding debt-
repayment obligations toward long-term lenders.
More formally, if L2 denotes the additional amount to be
borrowed short term in period 2, the borrower’s incentive con-
straint at the end of that period is written as
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$s 1(1 2t )(s1W 1 (s1 2 r1)L1 1 L2) 2 p2 · r* 2L2 2 p1r2L1,
where, if we stick to the same debt-monitoring technology as
before,
(A4) r* 2(1 2 p2) 5 r2(1 2 p1) 5 c.
Using (A4) to eliminate p1, p2, r2, and r* 2 in the incentive-
constraint (A3), we end up reexpressing (A3) as
(A38) s1W 1 (s1 2 r1)L1 1 L2 $ (c/ts1)( L1 1 L2).
Now if r1 5 0 (which corresponds to the best long-term
contract candidate for maximizing the borrowing capacity L2 and
thereby possibly delaying the occurrence of a slump), the above
incentive constraint becomes
L2 #
s1W 1 (s1 2 (c/ts1))L1
(c/ts1) 2 1
.
Using (A28) to substitute for L1,w eg e t
L2 #V· W,
where
V5
1
n 1s1
1
n
2 1
1
n
2 122 5b s
1
n
2 1
1
n
2 12 .
Whenever V,s , which, in particular, will be the case for b
sufficiently small and n sufficiently close to 1, then it will still be
the case that investment capacity will grow at a lower rate than
savings grows in a boom, so that even if we allow for long-term
debt contracts the occurrence of slumps will remain unavoidable.
However, note that allowing for long-term debt contracts may
increase the borrower’s investment capacity as compared with the
pure short-term borrowing case and yet not to a sufficient extent
that the occurrence of slumps can be avoided: for example, for n
close to 1,
(1/n)s1W ,V · W but still V,s . h
6
6
investment capacity
under short-term
borrowing
investment capacity
under long-term
bargaining
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Here we show how our model can easily be extended in order
to offer a micro-founded version of Goodwin’s [1967] model of
growth cycles.
Assume that the interest rate is permanently equal to r* [
[s1;s2] (if world capital markets were perfectly integrated,r* could
simply be the world real interest rate). In order to generate
ﬂuctuations in the proﬁt share, assume for simplicity a Leontief
production function: Y 5smin (K,L). Assume that µ 5 0 (only
business proﬁts can be directly invested in production) and that
the labor supply schedule is such that the wage rate v can take
only two equilibrium values: if v 5 v1 5 (1 2b )s, then labor
supply (in efficiency units) grows at a rate n from the previous
period, and if v 5 v2 5 (1 2b 8)s (with b8 ,band v2 . v1), then
labor supply grows at a rate n(1 1 a) (say that workers accept
working extra hours if they are paid a higher wage).
It follows that if gt(5Kt/Kt21) , n, then vt 5 v1, Wt
B 5 gr* ·
Wt21
B , with gr* 5 (1 2a )(bs 1 (bs 2 r*)((1/v) 2 1) and gt11 5 gr*.
Conversely, if gt . n, then vt 5 v2, Wt
B 5 g8 r*Wt21
B , with g8 r* 5
(1 2a )(b8s1(b8s2r*)((1/v) 2 1), and gt11 5 g8 r*. Therefore, if we
assume that g8 r* , n , gr* , n(1 1 a), there exists a two-period
cycle with g2t 5 g8 r*, v2t 5 v1 and g2t11 5 gr*, v2t11 5 v2: booms
contain the seeds of their own destruction because the implied rise
in wage rates reduces businesses’ future ability to invest (and
conversely for recessions). Unlike in our model, the capital share
of output is countercyclical (it ﬂuctuates between b and b8).
However, note that in both models, the net-of-debt-payments
proﬁt share of capital income (and of output) is countercyclical,
and it is the leading indicator of economic ﬂuctuations.
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